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ABSTRACT: Despite the comprehensive nature of many universities’ cyberstalking policies, the 
rapid rate of technological growth has created legal loopholes. The growing popularity of 
unregulated spyware apps--typically marketed towards employers and parents, has fallen into the 
hands of abusers, creating an innovative outlet to easily stalk victims.  Domestic violence 
shelters are increasingly receiving young victims who have been stalked by spyware apps. Thus, 
by analyzing the cyberstalking policies of three top universities, this study will seek to discover 
the effectiveness of fighting against those perpetuating violence through spyware apps. Finally, 
in comparison with the three schools, Northern Illinois University’s policy will be analyzed.  
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	 At the turn of the twenty-first century, mobile phones were expected to peak in relevancy, 
only to fade into obscurity. The evolving nature of the technology, however, surpassed even the 
top executives of the first mobile phone manufacturing companies. To date, mobile phones 
outnumber people in the United Kingdom, and it is projected that there will be 50 billion mobile 
devices worldwide by 2020 (Wray, 2009). We as a society have evolved with the popularity of 
mobile devices. Dependency is so prevalent within people to their mobile devices, that many 
young individuals report a feeling of fear without it near them at all times, or “nomophobia.” 
Cell phone users rely so heavily on the ubiquitous ways of using this medium of communication 
that they rarely go without their phones. 
Of course, with any quick evolution of technology comes the risk of abuse. Smartphone 
technology grants its users to download and customize applications on their phone. The creative 
nature of apps allows more advanced users to create their own. The dependency of mobile 
devices enables abusers to install exploitation into their victim’s extension of self. Spyware apps 
are quickly becoming the newest, legal way to stalk a victim’s mobile device without them ever 
knowing. Although 85% of domestic abuse shelters have worked directly with victims who have 
been stalked by spyware apps, advocates remain improperly trained due a lack of knowledge of 
the apps’ existence (Shahani, 2014). 
While cyberstalking policies are commonplace in university policy, the advanced 
evolving nature of mobile technology do not address new mediums of abuse such as spyware 
apps. In this paper, I will explore how universities have addressed the threat of spyware apps 
among young people. Through outlining how spyware apps work, their prevalence and use, and 
current legislation, my research among university policies can offer insight on how to remedy 
this technological plight. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Stalking has been viewed as a societal issue by legislators only since the 1990s, 
according to the Stalking Resource Center (2003). However, few could have anticipated the legal 
minefield that technology has produced, thus leaving cyberstalking victims legally uncovered. In 
2003, the Stalking Resource Center reported that all 50 states have stalking policies, but only 1/3 
of states cover cyberstalking (p. 1). California, for example, constitutes cyberstalking only 
through a credible threat that is “verbal, written, or electronically communicated statements and 
conduct” (p. 1). The broad language of laws does not protect victims who are being stalked in 
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unique, intrusive forms. The Stalking Resource Center urged individuals to contact state 
representatives to review the language of their cyberstalking laws in 2003. Yet, the Stalking 
Resource Center could not have possibly fathomed the extent to which cyberstalking would 
evolve.  
Tragically, technology has been used to exploit and violate individuals for over a decade. 
Preliminary research from Calman (2005) illustrates the threat of spyware technology on shared 
desktop computers. Services such as SpectorSoft, which allows parents to take screenshots of 
their children’s activity on the computer, have been in existence since 1999 (2005, 2100). 
Advertisements for stalking apps typically target employers and parents to monitor their 
employees and children, yet they do not make up the majority of the market. Over 40% of 
spyware was purchased with the intention to stalk a domestic partner by 2002 (Calman, 2005). 
Similar to spyware app technology, Calman warned individuals that their partner might be 
monitoring their activity on a shared computer (2005, p. 2097). A person utilizing spyware may 
record all Website history, instant messages, and overall keystrokes—all without their partner 
ever knowing. 
While spyware became a more identifiable threat with awareness, spyware apps came 
into existence shortly thereafter. Southworth & Tucker (2007) assert that spyware was no longer 
limited to desktop and laptop computers as early as 2006 (p. 669). The first spyware app, 
FlexiSpy, debuted in 2006 to “monitor kids and unfaithful spouses” (Southworth & Tucker, 
2007, p. 669). As advertisers became more transparent about the apps’ potential use, the 
technology has steadily risen. Cell phones allow an abuser to micromanage a smaller device, and 
monitor each and every keystroke (Southworth & Tucker, 2007). Southworth & Tucker explain 
that while phone companies may have access to call records, there are no guarantees that they 
can connect the crime to the perpetrator, making cell phones the most viable option to stalk 
(2006, p. 673).   
Regardless of a seemingly universal definition of stalking, the act was not criminalized 
until 1990 (Campbell & Moore, 2011). The nature of stalking can be mysterious and difficult to 
distinguish for the victim. Products of stalking often cannot be proven as illegal criminal 
offenses, such as threatening e-mails, texts, or calls (Campbell & Moore, 2011). Even more 
troubling, Campbell and Moore report that some victims may perceive jealous and threatening 
byproducts of stalking to be typical in a romantic relationship (2011). Thus, legitimate statistics 
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on those who have reported stalking is murky at best. To date, these numbers are climbing. 
College students, although equipped with the knowledge to identify stalking, are most likely to 
be stalked by a romantic partner (Campbell & Moore 2011). 
Although spyware apps have been in existence for years, even the most prevalent stalking 
resources do not comprehensively cover resources for spyware apps. The Stalking Resource 
Center addresses spyware on computers (2012). When addressing spyware apps on computers, 
The Stalking Resource Center primarily asserts that Caller ID spoofing is the problem; the only 
link on spyware apps is not a useable link (2012). However, in 2012, spyware apps were 
simultaneously picking up traction in other areas. The year 2012 introduced Minnesota Senator 
Al Franken’s bill, The Location Privacy Protection Act in an attempt to ban spyware apps 
(Ramasastry 2012). Although Franken’s bill has the capacity to assist the multitude of victims 
affected by spyware apps, not everyone bought its appeal. Ramasastry notes that 
telecommunications departments found Franken’s bill to be harmful for app innovation, and 
virtually impossible to pass (2012).  
Franken then attempted to pass the bill once and for all in 2014, calling it 
“commonsense” (Franken, 2014). To please telecommunication critiques, Franken attempted to 
remedy the issue by addressing corporations in the bill (Franken, 2014). To date, his bill has not 
passed.  Simultaneously, NPR interviewed the aforementioned Cindy Southworth, an advocate 
with the National Network to End Domestic Violence to expose the gravity of spyware apps in 
an innovative investigative report. Southworth asserts that our national concern with 
technological privacy and the government is short sighted (Shahani, 2014). Abusers utilize 
spyware app technology to perpetuate a power complex on their victim; spyware apps go beyond 
just the scope of surveillance (Shanhani, 2014). Unlike just watching a victim’s activity through 
a computer, the abuser has the option to control who the victim calls, log their messages, and 
hold them accountable with this information. NPR found that cyberstalking is now ingrained in 
domestic violence in the US (Shahani, 2014). 
In response to the NPR investigative report, many media outlets, such as CBS explored 
the legal repercussions these apps. CBS covered the arrest of Hammad Akbar, creator of the 
spyware app StealthGenie for his illegal activity (Dahl, 2014). Akbar bragged that StealthGenie 
is “100%” undetectable” on their partners phone (Dahl, 2014). Dahl explained that the arrest of 
Hammad Akbar started a dialogue about Minnesota senator Al Franken’s Bill, which would ban 
	 6	
GPS location-based spyware apps (2014). Despite the author’s idealistic intent, the bill has not 
been passed. Advocates such as Cindy Southworth are more skeptical of Akbar’s arrest, 
explaining that there are hundreds more of undocumented spyware apps (Dahl, 2014). 
Most recently, Knibbs (2015) harshly critiqued the legal system for a lack of action on 
spyware apps. Increased awareness of spyware apps has sparked a dialogue, but has inspired 
little legal action. Knibbs explains that apps such as mSpy and flexiSPY have had millions of 
downloads to date, according to their sales figures (Knibbs, 2015). Vague legal language still 
attempts to justify the spyware as intended employee and children use, yet mSpy stats indicate 
that 45-50% of users are utilizing the technology for “other” reasons (Knibbs, 2015). Because the 
potential for abuse is so apparent, mSpy has actually readjusted its policy to have stalkers 
identify as employers or parents in order to escape legal loopholes (Knibbs, 2015). Knibbs 
argues that law enforcement continues to be lax on the issue, which illustrates privacy issues 
within our own government (2015). 
                                    HOW SPYWARE APPS WORK 
The scope of spyware apps is rather astounding. Although hundreds of undocumented 
apps are not available through mainstream downloading sources, like the App Store, two apps 
can be noted as the top performers. Both mSpy and flexiSPY are estimated to have millions of 
users, according to their sales figures (Knibbs, 2015). The downloading process of these apps are 
relatively cheap—and simple. 
Similar to any subscription, these apps require the user to pay a small fee. mSpy, for 
example, costs $70 a month, or $200 a year (Shahani, 2014). The downloading process can take 
about of minute to install on a person’s phone, preferably jailbroken, or the process of removing 
restrictions on an iPhone. A person may feel comfortable giving their phone to their partner or 
perhaps leaving it easily available, granting the partner easy access. Yet, even if a person 
guarded their phone with a passcode, the app can be downloaded remotely (Knibbs, 2015). 
Meaning, the user never has to touch the phone for the stalking to commence.  
Apps such as mSpy feature three primary stalking services. In the case of domestic 
discord, for example, the abuser can listen in on a victim’s phone calls, or choose to reject them 
entirely. The second feature, the keylogger option, allows the potential stalker to log every key a 
victim types, making reading their texts entirely possible. Lastly, the stalker can at any time, take 
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a video to know the victim’s exact surroundings. Despite the overbearing presence of the app, 
the victim most likely will have no idea that they are being stalked.  
When utilizing these features, the stalking potential becomes limitless. Similar to the 
dangers of spyware apps on a computer, identity theft is probable. However, when applied to 
romantic partners, the stalking can has the potential to become more invasive. A person using a 
spyware app can view photos, no matter how personal they may be. Even if they did not 
recognize their immediate surroundings through photo or video, those using the app have access 
to the GPS feature (Knibbs, 2015).  
The GPS feature available in these apps is precisely what allowed a California man to 
find a woman’s location at her friend’s house, where he promptly murdered her in 2013 (Knibbs, 
2015).  Victims such as this woman may have been warned to turn off location services, but 
spyware apps are enduring; they cannot be turned off. Wherever the mobile device goes, the 
abuser can follow. The versatile cell phone, a communication medium once used to call the 
authorities to protect against stalking violence, has become the ultimate potential power tool for 
domestic abuse. 
                                        PREVALENCE AND USE 
The intent to stalk domestic partners through spyware apps is rampant, but difficult to 
prove. Sadly, a myriad of victims have no idea that they are being stalked through their cell 
phones. Both mSpy and flexiSPY strongly imply that they are intended for stalking a cheating 
partner, through advertisement of recording phone calls and spying on texts (Knibbs, 2015). 
Even though 40% of spyware was downloaded with the intention to stalk a domestic partner 
even in 2002, it is difficult to prove these intentions through surveys (Calman, 2005). Those with 
a true intention to harm another person can easily lie to further protect their identity. Murky 
statistical data and support can be attributed to the prevalence of spyware apps as well as a lack 
of government regulation.  
Murky Statistical Data and Support 
MSpy and flexiSPY are incognito on the phones of those being abused (Shahani, 2014). 
The Department of Justice found that GPS technology and spyware monitoring affects 1 in 13 
stalking victims (Fletcher & Kazdin, 2010). Knibbs estimates that spyware apps have received 
millions of downloads (2015). Therefore, comprehensive statistics on the prevalence of spyware 
app use are difficult to gather. Although mass media sources assure smartphone users that they 
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probably do not have to worry about spyware apps, domestic violence shelters illustrate a much 
different narrative. The recent rise of spyware app use has caused 85% of domestic abuse shelter 
advocates to have some experience with this form of abuse (Shahani, 2014).  
As a result, precautions such as a “digital detox” have been taught to advocates in an 
attempt to cleanse the victim of all technology (Shahani, 2014). The private location of domestic 
violence shelters, digital detoxes, and advocates supporting victims all appear to remedy the 
tragedy that is reflected in the increasingly common use of cyberstalking. However, the obtrusive 
nature of these apps paired with GPS technology allows abusers to permeate through even 
supportive measures such as these (Knibbs, 2015). An abuser can always locate their victim with 
a spyware app, making the technology forever useful and ubiquitous. 
Lack of Regulation 
Fletcher & Kazdin tell the story of Susan*, a woman who experienced spyware stalking 
by an ex-boyfriend (2010). While enjoying dinner at a restaurant with a date, Susan would 
receive texts from her ex asking how the food was (Fletcher & Kazdin, 2010). GPS technology 
paired with the ability to read texts and listen on calls grants abusers the ability to know their ex-
partner’s every move. Although authorities put Susan’s ex-boyfriend into custody, he showed up 
at her house twenty minutes after getting out of jail (Fletcher & Kazdin, 2010). Susan’s story 
illustrates the lack of regulation in extreme cyberstalking cases. Unfortunately, the police cannot 
prove that spyware apps are illegal, as they are unregulated by the government. Apps like mSpy 
and flexiSPY defy wiretapping laws by technically marketing the apps towards employers and 
parents (Knibbs, 2015).  
Hammad Akbar, creator of the spyware app StealthGenie was prosecuted for marketing 
illegal activity under the Wiretap Act (Knibbs, 2015). Akbar was only charged, however, 
because his website blatantly advertised the potential for abuse with his app. While certainly a 
victory for those affected by Akbar’s abusive marketing ploy of technology, his prosecution was 
rare and perhaps an isolated incidence. Spyware has been pertinent since the late 1990’s; the 
ability to stalk a partner has been relatively simple for years (Calman, 2005). Since the rise of 
spyware technology, only three prosecutions for the crime have been recorded (Knibbs, 2015). 
As long as apps like mSpy and flexiSPY are aware of legal loopholes, their creators will make 
adjustments to stay in big business. 
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      LEGISLATION 
 Knibbs poses a noteworthy question after illustrating the dangers of spyware apps: how 
are these spyware apps not illegal? (Knibbs, 2015). Theoretically, the Wiretap Act that indicted 
Akbar should discourage other perpetrators from using these apps. The Wiretap Act prohibits 
any incognito interception of communication (Knibbs, 2015). Clearly, the acts of stalking and 
wiretapping are both recognized as illegal under the law. However spyware apps are entirely 
legal under federal law using this model, though the technology is designed to navigate 
technological and legal loopholes. When considering the grand scope of spyware apps, Hammad 
Akbar proves to be the exception of spyware app prosecution. 
 The outlook of spyware app use prosecution appears bleak, yet some believe legislation 
to ban the technology is in the foreseeable future (Dahl, 2014). Outreach from the Minnesota 
Coalition for Battered Women prompted Senator Al Franken to introduce The Location Privacy 
Protection Act of 2014 (Franken, 2014). Franken’s bill would end the development and usage of 
spyware apps—once and for all. In addition, the bill would require companies gathering personal 
data from smartphones to disclose what they were using the personal data for (Franken, 2014). 
Finally, authorities would be given precedent to prosecute individuals and seize their profits from 
spyware apps (Franken, 2014).  
 Franken’s bill appears to be common sense. Nevertheless, his statistical data surrounding 
apps, anecdotal evidence of abuse from the local domestic violence shelter, and the strong 
support of Federal Trade Commission fail to convince consumers. The Software & Information 
Industry Association (SIIA) has expressed disdain for the bill, claiming it will stifle app 
innovation (Ramasastry, 2012). Citing the multi-stakeholder process, the SIIA argued that his 
bill obscures the initiative to boost user’s preferences through data collection (Ramasastry, 
2012). Four years of advocacy has not passed Franken’s bill, despite its clear assistance to 
victims of domestic stalking. Because legislative efforts have been nominal, victim support 
centers remain the most pertinent resources for victims of domestic stalking.  
                                                  METHODOLOGY 
Three model universities with highly acclaimed programs for sexual assault survivors 
were e-mailed about their spyware app policies. The universities studied were influenced by the 
VAWA Task Force presentation by Shana Ware, Advocacy Services Coordinator at Northern 
Illinois University. Ware recognized universities that offered excellent advocacy services. 
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Representatives were contacted from Rutgers’ Office for Violence Prevention and Victim 
Assistance, University of Michigan’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Awareness Center, and 
University of New Hampshire’s Sexual Harassment & Rape Prevention Program. In addition, 
representatives from Northern Illinois University’s Health & Wellness Center, Advocacy 
Services, and the police department were interviewed to compare policies. Each representative 
was told that any response would be featured in my research. Despite a diverse outreach to 
different universities, the vast majority of persons contacted did not respond. Five respondents 
consented to interview. The responses were analyzed using thematic analysis. 
In response to a lack of participation, I performed my own research given the university 
websites. In order to test the accessibility of the university’s webpages, I used simple search 
terms that the average undergraduate student may use if effected. Using the keywords “stalking,” 
“cyberstalking,” and “spyware apps” I analyzed the resources available to students off of the 
university’s main webpage.  
                                                        RESULTS 
I. INTERVIEWS 
I utilized a thematic analysis from the little information I was given about spyware apps. 
Most individuals did not respond to my request, partially due to confidentiality issues. Yet, the 
information I was given was brief at best with three major themes most applicable.  
Shifted or Shared Responsibility 
Many individuals reported that they knew of the topic, but felt others had more formal 
way of discussing the apps. Namely, the police were cited as the most credible source when 
dealing with these apps. As one individual with information cited some useful information about 
the apps, they immediately referred me to the police as “they may have a more formal way of 
addressing the topic.” These claims were not wrong, as the different victim support services and 
programs typically worked together when addressing spyware apps. A representative from 
University of Michigan told me, “[the] police department has a forensics technology division, 
and they assist survivors in doing forensics investigations of victim’s computers and other 
electronic devices.” Similarly, one respondent cited Title IX staff as an essential resource to 
assist Student Conduct. Even though victim support resources offered valuable resources, they 
were quick to share the responsibility with other departments to offer more comprehensive 
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support.  Thus no entity other than police took responsibility for knowledge of spyware apps or 
their use. 
Denial of Apps at Institution 
Despite the scope and magnitude of spyware apps in domestic abuse shelters, some 
institutional respondents reported no spyware app usage on their campus. Three factors were 
offered as explanations within this theme, namely other types of stalking, no experience with 
spyware apps, or confidential content. Interestingly, one respondent stated that the small, 
inclusive nature of their campus did not require a student to use spyware to stalk; they most 
likely already knew the person’s entire schedule. The respondent also noted social media served 
as a constant marker as to where the victim is at all times, noting, “spyware is not needed to find 
that person since the perpetrator already knows where to look.”  
Other participants noted that they “had no instances of spyware apps being used in 
stalking cases” but “[it] would [be] addressed only when it surfaces via audience members in 
presentations.” Yet, a respondent from the same university explained that while they cannot 
recall an incident, “our investigation group is aware of them and there are too many to list.” 
While awareness is pertinent, not all participants had the proper personal experience with the app 
to speak on the matter. 
Current Practices 
As for participants that had experience with spyware apps, some precautionary measures 
were noted. Police were always involved with the survivor support process, and forensics 
technology was used to detect the spyware. The efforts from the support programs coupled with 
the police resulted in prosecutions of those perpetuating domestic violence. In addition, 
advocates encouraged students to “regularly scan their computers for spyware or malware, 
change passwords frequently, and report suspicious activity.” In other cases, advocates were 
aware of spyware apps, and offered hypothetical practices if they were presented with the 
technology. As one participant stated, “our office would follow the policies and procedures 
outlined in the Title IX policy and student code.” 
II. UNIVERSITY WEBSITE SEARCHES 
The initial, and most accessible resource was the webpage of University of Michigan 
(https://www.umich.edu, April, 2016). When searching “stalking,” the page featured 23,800,000 
results. Particularly, the top results linked students to the notable Sexual Assault Prevention and 
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Awareness Center for support. Secondly, when examining “cyberstalking,” the website featured 
203,000 results. Multiple results included tips to block numbers on their mobile device and 
remove their social media presence. In addition, suggested resources were made for the victims 
on campus, off-campus, and with the police. Interestingly, despite the vast number of resources 
for stalking, the website featured only four results when examining, “spyware apps.” The four 
results on spyware apps featured computer guidelines for traveling outside the university and 
coding lessons. One result examined privacy issues in Android applications. Yet, the privacy 
concerns centered around the government, and not on potential domestic abuse. 
When examining the main Rutgers website, significantly less resources were featured in 
comparison to University of Michigan (http://www.rutgers.edu, April, 2016). “Stalking” 
produced 2,350 results. The Violence Prevention Program was featured first and foremost, as 
well as well as articles debunking myths that stalkers are not just “men in bushes.” 
“Cyberstalking” produced significantly fewer results. Only 43 results were noted, a significant 
difference from the University of Michigan. Some information was made available on what 
cyberstalking is, a few vague unrelated academic journals were offered. Interestingly, there were 
84 results for spyware apps. Yet, though these results warned of spyware and malware on 
computers, no information was offered on apps. 
The final model university, University of New Hampshire had the least amount of 
resources (University of New Hampshire, 2016). The keyword “stalking” produced 1,200 results. 
The first few links connect students to the highly acclaimed Sexual Harassment and Rape 
Prevention Program (http://www.unh.edu, April, 2016). A sharp decline in results occurred when 
searching “cyberstalking,” only yielding 33 results. Less information was linked to SHARPP. A 
Title IX report was featured as well. Primarily, cyberstalking produced students’ presentations on 
what cyberstalking entails. Spyware Apps yielded 4 search results. There was little to no 
information actually regarding spyware apps, featuring only one student report on holiday scams 
from McAfee from 2013. 
Lastly I compared the results to Northern Illinois University (Northern Illinois 
University, 2016). Although not chosen as one of the model universities, in no way does this 
comparison minimize the victim support efforts of Northern Illinois University. “Stalking” 
produced 361 results. Many of these links grant resources at the Women’s Resource Center, 
Sexual Misconduct, and Advocacy Services. A diverse number of resource centers were listed 
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despite fewer results in general. Cyberstalking yielded only fourteen results. The Women’s 
Resource Center proved to be most pertinent in defining cyberstalking and providing resources. 
However, these links are outdated as the Women’s Resource Center has been renamed the 
Gender and Sexuality Resource Center. The Student Handbook also touches upon it. When 
examining “spyware apps,” only six results are offered: two related to Nike’s identity fraud, one 
to ResTech spyware on computers, and three to my own research, but offered only information 
about my politics. These resources do not offer information about the apps. 
DISCUSSION 
 Limited interview data and few resources on university websites indicate that spyware 
apps remain largely unknown on college campuses. Advocates from some of the most well-
known victim support centers appear to range from having no experience to moderate experience 
with these apps. The most experienced group proved to be law enforcement. The high frequency 
of cyberstalking experiences as well as a formulaic process for screening for spyware apps 
proves that the technology is a threat. The grave nature of spyware apps is heightened when 
victims have no idea that the apps even exist. Thus, it is necessary that awareness surrounding 
spyware apps be spread.  
 We must encourage advocates at domestic violence shelters, as well as university faculty 
& staff, and law enforcement to take the threat of spyware apps seriously. Apps like flexiSPY 
and mSpy are specifically designed to make a victim seem insane when reporting what their 
stalker knows. Like any form of stalking—in person or online, these threats must be 
acknowledged and properly addressed. Unlike cyberstalking on a computer, mobile apps hold the 
potential to be very powerful tracking devices for abusers. Therefore, proper protocol is 
necessary to not only shut down GPS location as some advocates noted, but to attack the 
problem at the root: preventative measures to dismantle the app entirely.  
CONCLUSION 
 The lack of data on spyware apps is telling; even the most trained individuals may not 
know they exist.  Clearly, the ubiquitous use of mobile technology on college campuses coupled 
with the naiveté of most young users should require both educational programming as well as 
technological instruction in the threat of spyware apps. Young people in particular typically have 
more experience with advanced technology. Additionally, the culture of college students sharing 
and partaking in technology use is conducive to spyware abuse. An abuser can find their next 
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stalking victim in a span of a minute if a willing student lends out their phone to a stranger, 
friend, or partner to make a phone call.  
We cannot take the ‘nomophobia’ dependency of mobile devices lightly. An environment 
that normalizes constant mobile phone use will make spyware apps thrive. A consistent GPS 
location-tracking device only pinpoints the already constrained campus community, allowing an 
abuser to find their victim at an accelerated rate. This case study clearly indicates that the rapid 
change in technology is outstripping the changes in educational awareness and resources.  It is 
essential that college campuses take this seriously and react both positively and assertively to 
educate their students about this potential threat. 
The efforts of victim support units and police departments are to be applauded. When 
considering the novel nature of spyware apps, it is understandable that fewer resources exist. 
However, it is disconcerting that of the resources reviewed for this study, nominal information is 
provided to victims to combat the issue. Routine steps given to victims of cyberstalking, such as 
removing oneself from social media, turning off GPS locations, and changing their phone 
number, do not apply to this evolved form of technology. These apps hold the power to outsmart 
these meager efforts.  
As attempts are made to debunk the “stranger in the bushes” myth of sexual assault, we 
must apply this reframed paradigm to stalking through spyware apps. Close friends and partners 
are most likely to have access to the victim’s cell phone: not a complete stranger.  A looming 
suspicion of cheating, an affordable payment, and a swift download make a person a victim to 
abuse without their knowledge. Legislative stagnation suggests that spyware apps are not going 
away anytime in the foreseeable future, thus support and education must be offered in the 
meantime.  The research efforts and willingness to support these victims hold the potential for 
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